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Abstract
Information diffusion and influence maximization are
important and extensively studied problems in social
networks. Various models and algorithms have been
proposed in the literature in the context of the influ-
ence maximization problem. A crucial assumption in
all these studies is that the influence probabilities are
known to the social planner. This assumption is unre-
alistic since the influence probabilities are usually pri-
vate information of the individual agents and strate-
gic agents may not reveal them truthfully. Moreover,
the influence probabilities could vary significantly with
the type of the information flowing in the network and
the time at which the information is propagating in
the network. In this paper, we use a mechanism de-
sign approach to elicit influence probabilities truth-
fully from the agents. We first work with a simple
model, the influencer model , where we assume that
each user knows the level of influence she has on her
neighbors but this is private information. In the sec-
ond model, the influencer-influencee model , which is
more realistic, we determine influence probabilities by
combining the probability values reported by the in-
fluencers and influencees. In the context of the first
model, we present how VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)
mechanisms could be used for truthfully eliciting the
influence probabilities. Our main contribution is to
design a scoring rule based mechanism in the context
of the influencer-influencee model. In particular, we
show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms
when the scoring rules are proper and propose a reverse
weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appro-
∗Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian
Institute of Science, mail - mayur@csa.iisc.ernet.in
†Professor, Department of Computer Science and Automa-
tion, Indian Institute of Science, mail - hari@csa.iisc.ernet.in
priate mechanism to use. We also discuss briefly the
implementation of such a mechanism in viral market-
ing applications.
1 Introduction
Social networks are widespread and indeed provide an
effective medium to propagate information and to mar-
ket and advertise products. Examples of online social
networks include facebook, twitter, linked in, orkut,
etc. A social network, in a natural way, could be rep-
resented in the form of a graph in which an individual
is represented as a node and there is an edge between
two individuals if they are associated with each other.
Consider a situation in which a company has designed
a new gaming console which it wants to market on a
social network. As a marketing strategy, the company
can select a small set of influential users to whom it
provides the product for free. If these users like the
product, then they will recommend it to their friends.
These friends could get influenced by the users and will
perhaps buy the product. Some of these friends will in
turn recommend the product to their friends, leading
to a marketing cascade. An online social network is
an effective medium for launching such a marketing
campaign because it has much information about the
users as well as the relationship graph of users. The
choice of an initial set of users is critical here because
these initially selected users will decide the expected
number of users that would get influenced ultimately.
An important problem in this context is the influence
maximization problem - given a social network graph
and influence probabilities on each edge, how do we
select a small set of initial users so as to maximize
1
00
1
1
1
1
01
u
a
b
c
u
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
d
e
f
g
The influence probabilities for
product p1
The influence probabilities for
product p2
0.5
0.1
0.9
0.4
0.001
0.1
Figure 1: Variation of influence probabilities with
product
the number of users who get influenced. This problem
has been solved in the literature as an optimization
problem by assuming a suitable model of information
diffusion. Various algorithms have been proposed to
find the set of influential nodes in a social network
efficiently [8, 3].
The current models for information diffusion process
assume that the social planner knows the influence
probabilities accurately. There are many reasons why
this assumption is not true in practice. Consider an
example, say a seller wants to sell a newly released
book by some author and another seller wants to sell
a tennis racket. Both the sellers decide to use viral
marketing on a popular online social network to mar-
ket these products. To do this the seller will have to
find the values of influence probabilities on each edge
and find the influential set of nodes to initiate the cas-
cade process. Consider a typical user u and her set of
neighbors on the social network. See Figure 1. The
influence probability of u on each neighbor for a prod-
uct say book need not be the same for another product
say tennis racket. This is perhaps because u is a novice
tennis player but is good at English literature and her
friends know this, however, this particular information
is not available on this social networking site. Hence
her friends will be influenced more by her recommen-
dation of a novel to them than a tennis racket.
Thus, the influence probabilities can vary drastically
with the product being marketed, the time at which
the recommendation is made, and perhaps many other
factors. Building robust and accurate models for esti-
mating the influence probabilities from the currently
available data in online social networks is a difficult
task. The best way to know the influence probabil-
ities accurately is to elicit them truthfully from the
users themselves. However, the users need not reveal
the influence probabilities truthfully due to strategic
reasons. For example, a user might misreport by pro-
jecting a higher level of influence on her friends in order
to become a part of the initially active set.
The success of a viral marketing strategy or in gen-
eral influence maximization is critically dependent on
the initially chosen target set. This in turn depends
on the accuracy of the influence probabilities. More
generally, predicting information diffusion in a social
network critically depends on knowing the influence
probabilities.
In this paper we address the influence maximiza-
tion problem in an incomplete information setting in
which, influence probabilities are the private informa-
tion. Our objective in this paper is to extract influence
probabilities accurately using a mechanism design ap-
proach.
1.1 Relevant Work
Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos in [8] considered the al-
gorithmic problem of influence maximization proposed
by Domingos and Richardson in [6]. In this paper they
proved that this problem is NP-hard even for simple
models of information diffusion and for some of the
more complex models, it is not even constant factor ap-
proximable. They gave a constant factor approxima-
tion algorithm for the independent cascade model by
proving the sub-modularity of the influence function.
The greedy algorithm they propose assumes that the
influence probabilities are available to the algorithm.
There are a number of algorithms proposed in the con-
text of influence maximization in the recent years; we
mention only two papers here: (a) Leskovec, Krause,
and Guestrin [9] (b) Chen, Wang, and Yang [3]. These
two papers also contain a rich set of related references.
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Alon, Fischer, Procaccia, and Tennenholtz in [1] pro-
posed a game theoretic model for truthfully choosing
the agents that maximize the sum of indegrees in a di-
rected graph. In the model they propose, they consider
the outdegree of an agent as private information. The
objective of each agent is to be among the set of nodes
chosen by the algorithm. They propose several deter-
ministic and randomized strategy-proof algorithms to
achieve the objective of maximizing the sum of inde-
grees. The problem that we address in the present
paper is different and more general. The objective of
each agent in [1] is to maximize the number of neigh-
bors that she is able to activate in the 0-1 cascade
process. In our problem, on the other hand, the ob-
jective is to choose a set of agents that have maximum
reachability.
A mechanism design based framework to extract the
information from the agents has been proposed for
ranking systems [2]. The authors study incentives in
ranking systems, where agents try to maximize their
position in the ranking, rather than to obtain a cor-
rect outcome. They consider several basic properties
of ranking systems and characterize the conditions un-
der which incentive compatible ranking systems exist.
They show that in general no such system satisfying
all the properties exists.
Dixit and Narahari in [5] proposed query incentive net-
works in which the nodes, along with the answer are
aware of the quality of the answer. They proposed
a game theoretic model of query incentive networks
in which the quality of answer is the private informa-
tion. They designed a scoring rule based mechanism to
truthfully extract the quality of the answers from the
agents along with the actual answer. In our work, we
design the influencer-influencee model which is similar
to the game theoretic model presented in [5] for query
incentive networks. In [5] the rewards to the agents de-
pend on the truthfulness of the quality of answers they
report. In our problem, the payments to the agents de-
pend on the truthfulness of the influence probabilities
they report.
In the work by Goyal, Bonchi, and Lakshmanan in [7],
the approach is to use a machine learning based ap-
proach for predicting the influence probabilities in so-
cial networks. Intuitively, the approach they consider
is that if an individual x takes a total of a actions out
of b ≤ a actions were performed by its neighbor y be-
fore x, then there is a probability of b
a
that person x
will be influenced by y in future. Here the “action”
is the act of joining a community or group in a social
network which does not involve any effort or monetary
transfer. They validate the models they build on a real
world data set.
To the best our knowledge, the model presented in this
paper is the first one that captures strategic behavior
of agents in the information diffusion process. Using
this model, our aim is to elicit the true influence prob-
abilities from the agents in order to accurately com-
pute the set of highly influential nodes or predict the
progress of information cascades.
1.2 Contributions and Outline
In this paper, we design mechanisms to extract influ-
ence probabilities truthfully from the users of a so-
cial network. We first work with a simple model,
the influencer model , where we assume that each user
knows the level of influence she has on her neighbors
but this is private information. In the second model,
the influencer-influencee model , which is more realis-
tic, we determine influence probabilities by combining
the probability values reported by the influencers and
influencees.
The Influencer Model
First, we develop a game theoretic model for infor-
mation diffusion process in which we ask only the
influencer to reveal the influence probabilities on all
outgoing edges. We propose a VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves) mechanism [10] based approach. We show
that, without using money or any payment scheme the
ideal influence maximizing algorithm may not be in-
centive compatible. Then we show how a VCG mech-
anism based approach could be used.
The Influencer - Influencee Model
In this more general model, given an edge in the social
network, we ask the influencer as well as the influencee
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to reveal the influence probability on the edge. This
model is more realistic since, both the persons involved
in a connection, will have information about the in-
fluence probability. We design a payment scheme in
which we use scoring rules [11] to design the payment
scheme. We show that it is a Nash equilibrium to re-
port true influence probability in this mechanism. We
also design the reverse weighted scoring rule (derived
from the weighted scoring rule) which has several de-
sirable properties which, standard scoring rules like the
quadratic and spherical scoring rules do not possess.
Outline of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section (Section 2), we provide essential prelim-
inaries. We discuss the influencer model in Section
3 and the influencer-influencee model in Section 4.
In Section 5, we briefly discuss how the influencer-
influencee model could be implemented in a typical
viral marketing scenario.
2 Preliminaries
Several probabilistic models have been proposed to
model the spread of information in social networks.
We give here a brief overview of the Independent Cas-
cade Model. We will represent any social network by
directed graph G. We will say that an individual (a
node in the graph) is active if she is the adopter of the
innovation or the behavior and inactive otherwise. We
will assume that once an individual becomes active,
she cannot switch back to being inactive.
2.1 Independent Cascade Model
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of nodes in the so-
cial network. In this model we activate some subset
of nodes A initially. The information diffusion pro-
cess unfolds in discrete time steps (x = 1, 2, . . . ,) as
follows. Each node that becomes active at time step
x will try to activate each of its neighbors. A node
will get the chance to activate its neighbors only once,
that is at the time instant in which it becomes active.
A node i will successfully activate its neighbor j with
probability pij . Thus pij is the probability that node
i will activate node j conditioned on the event that
node j is inactive when node i got activated. The suc-
cessfully activated nodes at time instant x can now
activate their inactive neighbors at time instant x+1.
This process ends when no more nodes get activated.
Clearly this process will end in at most n − 1 time
steps, where n is the number of nodes.
2.2 Influence Maximization Problem
First we define the notion of an influence function.
Given an initially active set A that is a subset of V and
influence probabilities, the influence function denoted
by σ(A) is the expected number of active nodes at the
end of the diffusion process. The influence maximiza-
tion problem is, given a parameter k, a social network
graph G, and a model of information diffusion, to find
a set of k nodes in G to be activated initially (also
known as target set) such that, it will maximize the
influence function σ(A).
2.3 Scoring Rules
A scoring rule [11] is a sequence of scoring functions,
S1, S2, . . . , St, such that Si assigns a score Si(z) to ev-
ery z ∈ ∆(T ) where ∆(T ) denotes the set of probabil-
ity distributions on the set T = {1, 2, . . . , t}. Note that
z = (z1, z2, . . . , zt) with zi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , t and∑t
i=1 zi = 1. We will consider only real valued scoring
rules. Scoring rules are primarily used for compar-
ing the predicted distribution with the true observed
one. Suppose w ∈ ∆(T ) is the true observed distribu-
tion. Then the expected score of any general distribu-
tion z ∈ ∆(T ) against w is defined as
V (z|w) =
t∑
i=1
wiSi(z)
. The expected score loss is defined as
L(z|w) = V (w|w) − V (z|w)
A scoring rule S1, S2, . . . , St is called proper or in-
centive compatible if ∀z, w ∈ ∆(T ) with z 6= w,
4
L(z|w) > 0. If the scoring rule is proper, then it is
a best response for each agent to report its true prob-
ability distribution. The following are popular proper
scoring rules discussed in the literature [11]:
• Quadratic scoring rule:
Si(z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zt) = 2zi −
t∑
j=1
z2j
• Logarithmic scoring rule:
Si(z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zt) = ln zi
• Spherical scoring rule:
Si(z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zt) =
zi√∑t
j=1 z
2
j
• Weighted scoring rule
Si(z) =
2i · zi −
∑t
j=1 z
2
j · j
t
3 The Influencer Model
In this model we assume that only the influencer knows
the influence probabilities and only the influencer is
asked to report the probability values. The model is
as follows.
• The social planner has the entire graph structure
(V,E) of the social network. The players in the
game V = {1, . . . , n} are the users of the social
network.
• Here each agent i has the influence probability
vector θi ∈ [0, 1]
|E|as her private information.
The jth component of θi will give the influence
probability of i on node j. Let out(i) = {j ∈
V |(i, j) ∈ E} denote the set of successors of node
i. The social planner does not know anything
about the influence probability of node i on its
successors. For all other nodes, (non-neighbors of
node i), the influence probability will be zero and
this is known to the social planner as the social
planner has the structure of the graph. Prior to
starting the information diffusion process, the so-
cial planner asks each agent to report her influence
probabilities. The reports from the agents may or
may not be truthful.
• Given the reported influence probabilities, the so-
cial planner now computes the target set using an
influence maximization algorithm. Let this target
set be A.
• Let θ ∈ [0, 1]|E| be the true influence probabil-
ity vector, representing the influence probability
on each edge of the graph. Then the utility of a
player when the social planner chooses a target set
A is the expected number of neighbors activated
by that player. Also, without involving payments,
the valuation function for each agent is equal to
its utility that is,
ui(θ, A) = vi(θ, A)
Thus utility is proportional to the expected num-
ber of neighbors an agent is able to activate, given
the target set.
Here the valuation function represents the preferences
of the agents over the target set chosen by the social
planner.
3.1 A VCG Mechanism Based Ap-
proach
Consider the exact influence maximization problem
which optimizes the influence function. It has been
proven in [8] that this problem is NP-hard. Even if
we are given that the algorithm to choose the target
set finds the optimal solution, we can come up with an
example in which the agents would prefer to lie about
their preferences and still be better off. One such ex-
ample is given in the next subsection. We can make
this algorithm incentive compatible by introducing ap-
propriate incentives to the agents. An immediate and
natural approach is to use the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves) mechanisms [10]. We shall, in particular, ex-
plore the use of the Clarke payment rule [4] to make
this mechanism incentive compatible. The utility of
the agents with Clarke payments will take the form:
ui(θ, A) = vi(A) + pi(v1, v2, ..., vn)
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where pi is the discount offered to agent i by the social
planner.
In order to design a VCG mechanism, we first need to
prove that the social choice function is allocatively ef-
ficient. Note that, in our framework, the social choice
function is precisely the algorithm being used to choose
the target set. We will first prove the following useful
lemma which will immediately imply that the exact in-
fluence maximization algorithm is allocatively efficient.
To prove the lemma, we will first describe an equiva-
lent view of the independent cascade model given by
Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos in [8].
The influence probability of node i on j denoted by θij
gives the probability that node i will activate j given
that node j will be inactive at the instant when node i
becomes active. This event can be viewed as the flip of
a biased coin. In the process, let us say we flip the coins
on all the edges before the start of the cascade process
and check the result of the coin flip only when a node
becomes active and its neighboring node is inactive.
This change will not affect the final result and it is
equivalent to the original cascade process. We call the
edges on which the coin flip resulted in heads as live
edges and the remaining edges as blocked. Given this
equivalent view, if we fix the outcomes of all coin flips
and initially active set of nodes A, then we will get a
graph in which some edges are live and the rest are
blocked, depending on the outcome. Clearly in this
graph, if we run the cascade process, then the number
of nodes that are active will be the number of nodes
that are reachable from set A on a path that consists
of only live edges.
Thus we will consider a sample space S in which each
sample point corresponds to one possible outcome of
all the coin flips. If X denotes one such fixed out-
come of coin flips, we define σX(A) to be the number
of active nodes at the end of the cascade process for
the fixed outcome X and target set A. Then σ(A),
the expected number of active nodes at the end of the
cascade process, is given by:
σ(A) =
∑
X∈S
P [X ]σX(A)
Given this formula for σ(A), we can now prove the
following lemma.
lemma 1. Given a target set A, then
σ(A) =
n∑
i=1
vi(θ, A) + |A|
where vi is the valuation function of agent i which is
equal to the expected number of neighbors activated
by that agent.
Proof. Fix a sample point X from the sample space
S of all possible coin flips on the edges. Consider an
arbitrary node i in the graph. Let viX (A) be the num-
ber of neighbors activated by node i for outcome X .
More concretely, let us define d(A, v) where A ⊆ V
and v ∈ V as the shortest path distance between A
and a node v. Thus, d(A, v) = 0 if v ∈ A. Let,
RAv = {u ∈ V |(u, v) ∈ EX ∧ d(A, u) + 1 = d(A, v)}
where, EX is the edge set that is active for the out-
come X . RAv is the set of nodes that are lying on the
shortest path from set A to node v. Thus, we define
viX (A) = |{v ∈ N(i)|i ∈ RAv ∧ i  j ∀j ∈ RAv}|
where, the ordering  is lexicographic (we are break-
ing the ties in favor of the node with the highest lex-
icographic order). Also lexicographic ordering ensures
that a node is activated deterministically by exactly
one node for a fixed outcome X . Then we have,
σX(A) =
n∑
i=1
viX (A) + |A|
Also we can see that
n∑
i=1
vi(θ, A) + |A| =
∑
X∈S
P [X ]{
n∑
i=1
viX (A) + |A|}
Since
∑
X∈S P [X ] = 1, we have
n∑
i=1
vi(θ, A) + |A| =
∑
X∈S
P [X ]σX(A)
This implies
n∑
i=1
vi(θ, A) + |A| = σ(A)
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Figure 2: A stylized social network
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Thus, by using Lemma 1, we can say that an influence
maximization algorithm that finds the exact optimal
solution is allocatively efficient and hence VCG pay-
ments will give us strategy proof mechanism for this
algorithm [10]. Thus with VCG payments, the utility
for each agent will be :
ui(θ, A) = vi(A) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(A)− h(v1, ...vi−1, vi+1, ...vn)
Here h is some function independent of vi. Thus we
have the following result:
Theorem 1. The influence maximization algorithm
that finds an exact optimal solution is allocatively ef-
ficient and hence is dominant strategy incentive com-
patible under VCG payments.
3.2 An Illustrative Example
We now provide a simple example to illustrate how the
proposed model functions. Consider a simple social
network graph as shown in Figure 2. Assume that the
true influence probabilities are all 1 in the graph and
the algorithm for target set selection is an exact influ-
ence maximizing algorithm. Note that all the agents
in the network have complete information about the
network. If we want to choose only one node as the
target set, then clearly node j will be chosen, because
σ({j}) = 8, which represents the maximum influence
among all nodes present, as can be seen from the figure.
Now assume that, all nodes except node k report their
true influence probabilities. Consider node k, if this
node reports its true influence, then node j will be cho-
sen as target set and its utility will be 1, because she
will only be able to influence node m. This is because
when the cascade reaches node k at time x = 1, then
till that time its neighbor node l would have already
been influenced by node j at time t = 0. Now if node k
lies about its influence on nodem as 0, then node i will
be chosen as the influence maximizing target set. For
this target set, the utility of agent k will be 2 but now
the influence function will be σ({i}) = 7. Thus agent k
is better off by lying rather than reporting the truth.
Hence the exact influence maximization algorithm is
not incentive compatible without payments.
Now assume that we include the Clarke
payment scheme in this scenario and
h(v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) = 0. If node j is
chosen as the target set then agent k will be able
to influence agent m and she will get a monetary
payment of 7 units, thus total utility will be 8 and if
any other node is chosen as the target set, then node
k′s payoff will be lower.
Note: It may be noted that the greedy algorithm pro-
posed by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos in [8] is the
same as the exact influence maximization algorithm in
the special case |A| = 1. Thus the above example also
shows that the greedy algorithm is not incentive com-
patible. We can construct examples for other heuristic
based algorithms like the high degree heuristics [8], de-
gree discount heuristics [3] etc., to illustrate that they
are not incentive compatible. All these algorithms use
the information reported by the agents directly to se-
lect the target set. Thus, none of these algorithms are
strategy-proof. However the randomized algorithm in
which we select the nodes in the target set uniformly
randomly is strategy-proof. But the expected influence
of this algorithm is low as shown by the experiments
done in [8].
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4 Influencer - Influencee Model
The obvious limitation of the influencer model dis-
cussed above is the restricted assumption that the in-
fluencer alone decides the influence probabilities. In a
real world social network, given a social connection be-
tween two individuals, both the individuals will have
information about different aspects and properties of
the connection. The influencer-influencee model tries
to leverage this fact in designing an incentive compati-
ble mechanism for eliciting influence probabilities. An
advantage of the mechanisms designed with this model
is that the agents need not know any information be-
yond its neighborhood. We now describe this model
and propose a mechanism based on scoring rules for
truthfully eliciting influence probabilities.
4.1 The Model
• Given a directed edge (i, j) in the social network,
the social planner will ask:
– agent i (the influencer) to report her influ-
ence probability θij on j and
– agent j (the influencee) to report agent i′s
influence on her.
Thus the social planner will ask each agent to re-
veal the probability distribution over each edge
which is incident on it and which is emanating
from it. We can consider the activation probabil-
ity on each edge as a probability distribution over
the set {active, inactive}.
• Given these influence probabilities, the social
planner will compute:
– the influence maximizing target set using an
influence maximization algorithm and
– the amount of discount to be given to the
agents based on their reported probability
distribution on edges using a scoring rule
based approach that will be described soon.
• Consider an agent i. Let out(i) = {j|(i, j) ∈ E}
and in(i) = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}. Thus agent i acts as
influencer to nodes in the set out(i) and acts as
the influencee for the nodes in set
in(i). In this model an assumption is that agent i
knows the influence probabilities on the edges that
are incident on i and that are emanating from i.
Thus agent only knows about the influence prob-
abilities in its neighborhood and nothing beyond
that.
• Also no agent knows what influence probability is
reported by the agents in its neighborhood. The
only way an agent can predict the reported prob-
ability by its neighbor is by her own assessment
of it. Thus we assume that for any given pair of
nodes i and j having edge (i, j) between them,
the conditional probability distribution function
P (θjij |θ
i
ij) which has all the probability mass con-
centrated at θjij = θ
i
ij .
• Here we discretize the continuous interval [0,1]
into 11+ǫ equally spaced numbers and agents will
have to report the influence probability by quoting
one of the 11+ǫ numbers. More concretely, given
set T = {1, 2, . . . , t} we define z ∈ {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, ..., 1}t
such that
∑t
i=1 zi = 1. For the case of our prob-
lem, T = {active, inactive}, thus agents will only
have to report one number θij ∈ {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, ..., 1}.
Based on this model we will now design a scoring rule
based payment schemes.
4.2 A Scoring Rule Based Mechanism
We now consider a scoring rule based payment scheme
in which we incentivize agents for reporting the true
probability distribution on each edge. In this mecha-
nism, the payment to an agent i depends on the truth-
fulness of the distribution she reveals on edges incident
on i as well as on the edges emanating from i.
First we state a lemma without proof. The lemma
quantifies the amount of loss that an agent suffers by
not reporting its true type.
lemma 2. If w, z ∈ {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, ..., 1}t, 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 such
that
∑t
i=1 wi = 1 and
∑t
i=1 zi = 1 and zi = wi ± ǫ for
at least one integer 1 ≤ i ≤ t, then
• For quadratic scoring rule
V (z|w) ≤ V (w|w) − 2ǫ2
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• For the spherical scoring rule
V (z|w) ≤ V (w|w) − 1.5ǫ2
• For weighted scoring rule
V (z|w) ≤ V (w|w) − ǫ2
We develop the mechanism assuming the quadratic
scoring rule. A similar development will follow for
other proper scoring rules. In the proposed mecha-
nism, the payment received by an agent i is given by
(
vi(A, θ) +
d2i
2ǫ2
)( ∑
j∈in(i)
V iji(
ˆ
θjji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
V iij(
ˆ
θjij |θˆ
i
ij)
)
where di is the degree of agent i, V
i
ij() is the expected
score that agent i gets for reporting the distribution
θˆiij on the edge (i, j). We are now in a position to
state and prove the main result of this paper. The
theorem specifically mentions quadratic scoring rule
for the sake of convenience but will hold for any proper
scoring rule.
Theorem 2. Given the influencer-influencee model,
reporting true probability distributions is a Nash
equilibrium in a scoring rule based mechanism with
quadratic scoring rule.
Proof. We will first consider the strategic behavior of
any arbitrary agent i considering only the agents in
the set S = in(i) ∪ out(i). In the payment scheme,
the agents belonging to the set V \ S can only affect
the valuation vi(A, θ). The expected payoff an agent
i gets is given by
∑
j∈in(i)
1∑
θji=0
P (θjji|θ
i
ji)vi(A, θ)V
i
ji(
ˆ
θjji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
1∑
θij=0
P (θjij |θ
i
ij)vi(A, θ)V
i
ij(
ˆ
θjij |θˆ
i
ij)+
d2i
2ǫ2
( ∑
j∈in(i)
1∑
θji=0
P (θjji|θ
i
ji)V
i
ji(
ˆ
θjji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
1∑
θij=0
P (θjij |θ
i
ij)V
i
ij(
ˆ
θjij |θˆ
i
ij)
)
Note that the valuation vi(A, θ) is dependent on the
assessment of the influence probabilities by agent i in
its neighborhood. Every agent will now try to maxi-
mize the expected payoff by considering the strategies
of agents in its neighborhood. If all the agents in the
neighborhood are truthful then we have
∑
j∈in(i)
1∑
θji=0
P (θji|θ
i
ji)vi(A, θ)V
i
ji(θji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
1∑
θij=0
P (θij |θ
i
ij)vi(A, θ)V
i
ij(θij |θˆ
i
ij)+
d2i
2ǫ2
( ∑
j∈in(i)
1∑
θji=0
P (θji|θ
i
ji)V
i
ji(θji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
1∑
θij=0
P (θij |θ
i
ij)V
i
ij(θij |θˆ
i
ij)
)
Now consider the expression
(
vi(A, θ) +
d2i
2ǫ2
)( ∑
j∈in(i)
V iji(θji|θˆ
i
ji)+
∑
j∈out(i)
V iij(θij |θˆ
i
ij)
)
Now Let
β =
∑
j∈in(i)
V iji(θji|θji) +
∑
j∈out(i)
V iij(θij |θij)
Thus β is the expected score agent i gets when she
reports the true distribution over all the edges. Also,
by probability mass assumption, this is the expected
score she will receive when she reports truthfully.
Thus, if an agent is truthful then, she will receive a
payoff given by (
vi(A, θ) +
d2i
2ǫ2
)
β
Let vi(A, θ) be the true valuation of an agent and
v′i(A, θ) the valuation when agent lies. That is when
agent reports some θˆiij 6= θij . Consider the utility of
an agent when she lies on only one of the edges(
v′i(A, θ) +
d2i
2ǫ2
)(
β − 2ǫ2
)
When an agent reports a probability value that is ±ǫ
away from the true probability value, the quadratic
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scoring rule (Lemma 2) ensures that the agent gets
payoff lower by 2ǫ2 for that edge. Now, we assume the
worst case scenario in which agent gains maximum by
reporting the false probability value on only a single
edge and that too minimum possible deviation from
the true value, Since we divide the [0,1] probability
interval into 1/ǫ numbers, agent i has to report the
probability value that is at least ǫ away from the true
probability value. That is, agent i will have to report
some probability value θˆiij = θij ± ǫ. This gives us(
β − 2ǫ2
)
.
An agent cannot get a higher score for lying, as the
quadratic scoring rule is incentive compatible. Thus
the agent can gain only in the valuation part. Now
by reporting a false probability distribution, the agent
can get a valuation greater than true valuation by say
δ that is,
v′i(A, θ) = vi(A, θ) + δ
where δ ∈ [0,
∑
j∈out(i) θij − vi(A, θ)]. Thus by report-
ing a false probability value, an agent gets a payoff
of (
vi(A, θ) + δ +
d2i
2ǫ2
)(
β − 2ǫ2
)
Thus for the agent to remain truthful we require that(
vi(A, θ) +
d2i
2ǫ2
)
β ≥
(
vi(A, θ) + δ +
d2i
2ǫ2
)(
β − 2ǫ2
)
=⇒ d2i + (vi(A, θ) + δ) 2ǫ
2 ≥ δβ
As the agents are rational di ≥ δ ≥ 0. Also, for the
quadratic scoring rule the maximum possible expected
payoff for each edge will be at most 1. Thus, β ≤
di. Now, we have δβ ≤ d
2
i and (vi(A, θ) + δ) 2ǫ
2 ≥ 0.
Thus, it is a best response strategy for an agent to
report truthfully when the agents in its neighborhood
are truthful.
We still have to resolve the case for agents belonging
to the set V \S. Note that these agents only affect the
valuation of agent i. In the above analysis, the best re-
sponse strategy for an agent was derived by assuming
that with minimum possible deviation from reporting
true probability values, agent i is able to gain maxi-
mum possible valuation. Thus even if agents in V \ S
report any arbitrary values, a best response strategy
for agent i is to report truthfully. Thus without know-
ing the strategy of agents in set V \S, the best response
for an agent i is to report truthfully. Thus reporting
true influence probabilities is a Nash equilibrium in
this mechanism.
Note that the social planner will have to choose the
value of ǫ which will decide the accuracy of the prob-
ability values extracted from the users. Smaller the
value of ǫ, greater the payment the seller will have to
make to the users. The main advantage of this mech-
anism is that the seller can use any of the algorithms
to select the target set. The agents will be truthful
regardless of which target set is chosen.
A similar payment scheme will work with other scor-
ing rules namely logarithmic, spherical, and weighted
scoring rule. We omit this due to constraints of space.
4.3 The Reverse Weighted Scoring
Rule
Standard proper scoring rules such as quadratic, log-
arithmic, spherical, and weighted scoring rules have a
serious limitation in the current context. If the influ-
ence probability on an edge is zero, all these scoring
rules will give an expected score of 1. Thus, if the
social network is the empty graph in which all the
edges are inactive, these standard payment schemes
will give maximum possible expected score. We now
propose the following reverse weighted scoring rule to
overcome the above limitation:
Si(z) = 2zi(t− i)−
t∑
j=1
z2j (t− j)
We now show that this scoring rule is proper.
lemma 3. The reverse weighted scoring rule is a
proper scoring rule.
Proof. Consider the expression for the expected score
of reverse weighted scoring rule, given distributions z
and w:
V (z|w) =
t∑
i=1
wiSi(z)
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=
2
∑t
i=1 wizi(t− i)−
∑t
i=1 z
2
i (t− i)
t
V (w|w) =
t∑
i=1
wiSi(w)
=
2
∑t
i=1 w
2
i (t− i)−
∑t
i=1 w
2
i (t− i)
t
=
2
∑t
i=1 w
2
i (t− i)
t
L(z|w) = V (w|w) − V (z|w)
=
∑t
i=1(wi − zi)
2(t− i)
t
since, i ≤ t the loss is always positive. Thus, reverse
weighted scoring rule is proper.
It can also be shown that the the reverse weighted
scoring rule also satisfies the following desirable prop-
erties:
1. The expected score is proportional to the influence
probability.
2. If θij = 0 then the expected score for the edge
(i, j) to both the agents u and v is zero. That is,
V iij(θ
j
ij |θ
i
ij) = V
j
ij(θ
i
ij |θ
j
ij) = 0 if θij = 0.
Property 1 is desirable because the social planner
would want to reward the agent which revealed the
social connection through which the product can be
sold with high probability. Property 2 ensures that
an agent does not get anything for revealing a social
connection through which the product cannot be sold.
5 Implementation in Viral Mar-
keting Scenarios
Since the mechanisms presented under the influencer-
influencee model involve payments, the influence max-
imization process will involve monetary transfers. We
now discuss the implementation of the mechanism in
the context of viral marketing in an online social net-
work like facebook, orkut, etc.
Consider that a seller wants to market a certain prod-
uct through a given social network. The seller can now
ask each user in the social network to reveal her influ-
ence on each of the users in their friends list. Users
have incentive to participate in this mechanism be-
cause each user will get a certain positive payment
based on the influence probabilities they report. The
seller can ask each agent to report the influence prob-
ability by developing the application on the social net-
work. There are a large number of applications on the
social networks like orkut, facebook etc. which users
use extensively for playing games and socializing on-
line.
In an online social network like facebook, for example,
if a user is interested in the product to be sold, then
she can grant the access to the application. Now, this
application will have full access to the friends list and
other profile information of the user that is public.
Thus such an application can be implemented in an
online social network without any privacy issues. The
seller will first have to fix the level of accuracy that
she needs before starting the information extraction
process.
Now, given the influence probabilities, the application
will compute the influence maximizing target set. The
application will also compute the payment to be made
to the user. This payment can be made in the form
of a discount (up to 100 percent) on the product or
discount coupons or complimentary gifts or a combi-
nation of these. The marketing and sale of the product
will now proceed as in the independent cascade process
and users will get appropriate discounts based on the
reported influence probabilities. Since the payment
scheme ensures incentive compatibility, every user will
truthfully reveal the information to the seller via the
application.
6 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed mechanisms for elicit-
ing influence probabilities truthfully in a social net-
work. Influence maximization in general and viral
marketing in particular are the immediate applica-
tions. The work opens up several interesting questions:
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• In this model we assumed that the influence prob-
ability is known exactly to the agents. We can re-
lax this assumption and assume that agents know
the belief probability rather than exact influence
probability.
• In the influencer model, does there exist an in-
centive compatible algorithm having a constant
factor approximation ratio with or without pay-
ments?
• In the influencer model, does there exist a heuris-
tic based incentive compatible algorithm which
may not have theoretical guarantees about the ap-
proximation but in a practical sense it performs
well?
• In the influencer-influencee model, the payments
depend on ǫ which decides the accuracy of the
probability distribution. The higher the accuracy
is required, the higher is the payment to be made
to the user. An interesting direction of future re-
search would be to design incentive compatible
mechanisms that are independent of this factor.
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